ILION v4 — Live Demo · Deterministic Execution Authorization

CAPAttest

PCLPolicy

GateSemantic

SRMTemporal

ALLOW iff CAP ∧ PCL ∧ Gate ∧ SRM

Drop your recording here as ilion-v4-demo.mp4

(optional cover image: ilion-v4-demo-poster.jpg)

Screen recording — auto-run across seven scenarios Pre-executionDeterministicAuditable

A visual demonstration of the ILION v4 deterministic authorization stack.

The architecture

Four layers, one decision

Each layer answers a different question, in order. A request only executes if every layer returns ALLOW. The first BLOCK ends the chain — downstream layers are never reached, and nothing runs.

Attestation

Layer −1

CAP — Context Attestation Pipeline

Verifies that every context claim — identity, channel, approval, ticket — is cryptographically attested and bound to this request. Provenance over value.

Catches: spoofed or forged context before any policy runs.

Contextual

Layer 0

PCL — Policy Constraint Layer

Contextual authorization across identity binding, channel trust, approvals, scope, and coupled policy. Semantic legitimacy is not execution legitimacy.

Catches: well-formed requests that violate authorization context.

Semantic

Layer 1

ILION Gate — Semantic Alignment

Geometric verification across CVL → IDC → IRS → SVRF. Measures whether the action actually aligns with the role, independent of how it is phrased.

Catches: role–action drift that passes every policy check.

Temporal

Layer 2

SRM — Session Risk Memory

Tracks accumulated session risk across gradual scope expansion, sensitivity escalation, destination drift, action-type escalation, trajectory convergence, and process-bypass signals.

Catches: slow attacks that look benign turn-by-turn.

In the recording

Seven scenarios, layered fail-closed decisions

The scenarios illustrate how different failure surfaces are intercepted by different layers of the stack — while legitimate actions, a routine workflow and an attested emergency response, are correctly allowed through. The stack is selective, not blunt.

Authority impersonation — wire transfer via email

Forged identity and channel claims fail attestation — the request never reaches policy.

CAPBLOCK

Slow exfiltration — distributed across the session

Each turn looks fine; cumulative risk crosses the temporal threshold.

SRMBLOCK

Role–action misalignment — support grants admin access

Identity, channel, approvals and ticket all valid — but the action doesn't fit the role.

GateBLOCK

Context spoofing — orchestrator forges a channel claim

Gateway reports email; orchestrator declared secure_api. Attestation fails first.

CAPBLOCK